

THE
Case Re-stated;

OR AN

EXAMINE of a late Pamphlet,

INTITLED,

*The State of the Nation for the
Year 1747, &c.*

WHEREIN

The Disfingenuity and secret Views of
the AUTHOR are exposed, and the Con-
duct of the present ADMINISTRATION
explained and justified.

In a LETTER to a FRIEND.

Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.

D U B L I N :

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M DCC XLVIII.



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T H E

The Case Re-stated, &c.

December 31, 1747.

My Dear Friend,

WHEN Men of your Capacity and Experience alarm themselves about publick Affairs, on the Report of any puny Adept in Politicks, who, from his Garret, sets up for a Censor of publick Measures, and Reformer of the State, it becomes the Friend to offer the faithful Hand towards leading from the Path of Illusion. Nor does it less behove the true Patriot to step forth, on such Emergencies, and distinguish himself from those, who, under fair Pretences, work to undermine the Government, and ruin the State.

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Nothing

Nothing can appear more evident, than that the Author of *The State of the Nation for the last Year*, the Work that has raised such gloomy Ideas in your Mind, has had a View to distressing the State, in order to bring on some signal Convulsion, as necessary towards producing a Change in the Constitution ; or, in the Words of a late extraordinary * Pamphlet, of *restoring the old Constitution*. Nothing is more certain, than that this pretended Patriot would bring upon us, in Reality, all those big impendent Evils which he suggests, and seemingly writes to avert ; for cautious and covered as he is, we find him, on Occasions, exposing the cloven Hoof, and betraying the deep Secrets of his Scheme.

After he had wrote a Book, perhaps the most licentious and seditious that has appeared in our Age ; after he had given the Ministry the highest Provocation, and furnished them with the most colourable Pretext for attempting a Restraint of the Press ; after, I say, this masqued Patriot had done all in his Power to irritate and inflame, he put his Readers in Mind, that the Court is hatching a Scheme for subverting our Liberties.

* * I thought

* Apology for the Conduct of a late celebrated second rate Minister, &c.

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* I thought it proper to say so much,
 as it is part of the *State of the Nation* to
 understand our natural Rights, and to
 be guarded against a *Bill in Embryo*, pro-
 jecting to destroy them : since it matters
 little that we have shewn what particular
 Affairs are transacting, when perhaps
one is in Agitation of more Importance
 to our Welfare, than all the rest put to-
 gether.

A Man that apprehended an Intention to
 restrain the Press, and really wished to pre-
 vent it, would write with Decency and
 Calmness ; and if he found Fault with the
 Ministerial Conduct, would speak of Mini-
 sters with Deference and good Manners.
 But he who would urge on every Measure
 for inflaming the Minds of the People, and
 ripening them for a Change, would use
 such Means as should appear more likely
 to hurry on the inflaming Measure he pre-
 tended to dread and explode. Thus are we
 told by the late Mr. *W——n* himself, or
 his Apologist, that in order to bring on,
 with the greater Certainty, a War with
Spain, which would open a Way to that
old Constitution he was so passionately fond
 of, he managed his Defence of the *Conven-*
tion so as to defeat, rather than promote the
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' pacific Purposes of that Compact. * And
 ' for this Reason, says the Apologist, page
 ' 45, though I was not at Liberty to op-
 ' pose the *Convention* directly, I took care
 ' that my Justification of it should rather
 ' inflame, than abate, the Feuds and Heats
 ' both within Doors and without ; inso-
 ' much, that I may say I had contributed
 ' as much to the *Spanish* War, by my
 ' Manner of opposing it, as those that had
 ' openly recommended it.'

This Legacy of Mr. *W*——n's, whether
 his own, or another's, has opened the Eyes
 of the Public in regard to the *Sempronius's*
 of the present Age ; and it is to be hoped,
 for the future, they will be watched and
 guarded against, as being more dangerous
 than those whom we look upon as our here-
 ditary Enemies. The *French* are at pre-
 sent our open Enemies, and as such, I am
 for pursuing them to Destruction, as far as
 is consistent with the real Interest of my
 Country ; but I have no Notion of risking
 the Welfare of dear *England* out of Resent-
 ment to *France*, because I have been taught
 to hate *Frenchmen* as our hereditary En-
 mies.

This hereditary Animosity our Author
 builds upon for declaiming *Englishmen* to a
 disrelish for Peace, though there be no
 Prospect

Prospect of Success by a Continuance of the War. But this Writer, like that of *Faction detected*, knew the Excess of our Propensity to hate the *French*, and thinks to play the same Game, by Aid of that national Weakness, with equal Success.

The Author of *Faction detected*, lured us to provoke *France*, I may say wantonly and injudiciously, to declare War against these Kingdoms ; and the Author of *the State of the Nation* attempts to lure us, in his Turn, to a Continuance of that War, against all the obvious Lights of Reason and Experience. Are not the Schemes of both these Writers founded on similar Plans ? Does not the latter, who urges the Increase of our Debts and Taxes beyond our Strength, to prosecute an inauspicious War ; does not the former, who wrote us into too good an Opinion of our own Force, and too mean a one of that of *France* ; do not these Declaimers, I say, work upon similar Plans ? And what other can this Plan be except that of Mr. *W——n's*, wherein he recommends the following passive Conduct to all such as wish well to his beloved *old Constitution*.

‘ * Let all who are fond of *War*, and
‘ Parades on the *Continent*, be indulged.

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‘ Let

* Apology, Pag. 49.

• Let all who would maintain a large stand-
 • ing Corps of *cherished foreign Mercenaries*,
 • have their Way. Let those who would
 • increase our Debts, be pleased. And
 • let *those who would prolong the War*, to
 • increase these Pledges, and for a Pretext
 • to continue the aforesaid *Mercenaries* in
 • our Pay, be praised and supported. In
 • short, let all who would impoverish the
 • People, in order to humble them ; and
 • corrupt them, in order to efface all ge-
 • nerous Notions of Posterity, and their
 • Country, out of their Breasts ; let those,
 • I say, have Rope enough, and they will
 • better answer our Purpose than *France*,
 • even if she were sincere and inclined to
 • serve us.

Who, in his Senses, can argue against
 the Rectitude of Mr. *W——n's* Scheme ?
 'Tis founded on Maxims self-evident and
 uncontrovertible. If People are forced
 upon an unhopeful Attempt, are obliged
 to pursue ill Success, and have their Bur-
 den augmented, in order to continue such
 Pursuit, must not the Consequences be
 Discontent, Sedition and Disaffection, which
 generally grow up to Convulsions, and
 often to an entire Change of Government ?
 And who, that allows himself Time to re-
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flect in the least, can dis-believe that the Views of this Author, who has transformed himself into various Shapes, the better to impose and deceive, are the same with those established by the Apologist and his Brother *Proteus*, the Author of *Faction detected*?

This latter, as the other two, cloathed himself with *Whiggish* Principles, as most likely to answer his Purpose of Deception, though his whole Scheme was most notoriously built on Maxims diametrically repugnant. And to gloss over his Deception, he sets out with this pompous but dangerous Proposition, ‘The Criterion of a *Whig* ‘*Conduēt* is to resist and reduce the Power ‘of *France*.’ On this Basis was the System of that voluminous Writer built, and on the like has the present Writer raised all his Engines for unhinging our present happy Establishment.

France, with him, is to have no Peace, let her sue never so humbly for it, till she is conquered and undone.—‘It was a Maxim ‘among the old *Romans*, says he, never to ‘leave an Enemy unconquered.’ But that we may be the more animated to indulge to the national Enmity to *France*, he sets before us the Examples of our wisest Monarchs, as he miscalls all those, who, to
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subdue the *French*, had well nigh ruined the *English*. * ‘ In the time of our *Edward III.* Uniformity of Action appeared in its full Spirit and Splendor, this at once animated our Councils, and gave Vigour to our Arms. The same Prince that headed the Army, ruled in the Cabinet: *Nor has there been a Sovereign, from the Time of this Edward to that of Elizabeth of immortal Memory, but what looked on the Court of France as their ENEMY, and always so treated it.* After which a long Interval furnishes us at once with different Politicks, and less glorious Monarchs, till *William III.* like another good Angel, appeared to redeem our past Follies, to recover our lost Commerce, and to inspire us with a just Sense of the imminent Danger attending us, by being in Friendship with *France*.’

You will necessarily observe a String of tacit Reflection on our present Monarch for not heading our Army, and Inaccuracies, or rather Inconsistencies, pompously blended together, and ornamented with the Sanction of some of our most revered old Kings, purposely to impose on the too good Nature of *Englishmen*, who are taught, from the Cradle, to boast a Hatred to the *French*.

French. Had not this inaccurate Writer built too strongly on our *Prejudice* to that Nation, he would not have set such Examples before his Readers, as ought, in reality, to raise their Indignation against him. Is there one ever so little read in our Annals, that knows not that the Ambition, or rather, the Enmity of our *Edwards* and *Henries* to *France*, had vainly cost this Nation an Ocean of Blood and Treasure. And how much more of both we spent in latter Days, to indulge our natural *Prejudices*, I leave this Author to calculate.

But upon what Grounds do these masked *Whigs* raise their Proposition, *that the Criterion of a Whig Conduct is to resist and reduce the Power of France?* Would *Whigs* undertake the Reduction of *France* without any Prospect of Success? Would they destroy *England* in a fruitless attempt of reducing *France*? Such cannot be the Policy of *Whigs*, unless of such *Whigs* as the *Apolo-*
gist paints out all our Statesmen since the Revolution to have been. But that a Name I venerate, as much as I do that of *Whig* in its genuine, primitive Meaning, may no longer suffer by Pretenders and false Brethren, I beg leave to deny this Proposition to be true, for the following
few

few Reasons, among a thousand, that might be instanced.

The *Whigs* in *Charles II.* Reign, persecuted the Earl of *Danby*, afterwards Duke of *Leeds*, and principal Promoter of the Revolution, and would have brought him to the Block, tho' it was notorious that he was an Enemy to *France*, and had obstructed all her Machinations at our Court, while he had any Influence there, as appeared by the Measures pursued as soon as he was obliged to retire.

In King *William's* Reign, the *Whigs* indicated no innate Aversion to *France*, when they could advise and conduct the *Partition Treaties*, which, in their Consequences, gave *Spain* and the *Indies* to the House of *Bourbon*, and for which these *Whiggish* Counsellors and Negotiators were afterwards impeached by a rank *Tory* House of Commons, an amphibious Generation that brags of Principles and have none. There is no denying, that the obvious Meaning of the *Partition Treaty* was increasing the Power of *France*; and such were its direct Consequences; nor can it be less denied that it had been proposed, negociated, and concluded by *Whigs* Abroad; defended, maintained, and applauded in Parliament
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by *Whigs* at Home ; so that *resisting* and *reducing* the Power of *France*, was not always the *Criterion of a Whig Conduct*.

But to bring the Point Home to our present *Whigs*, who are not, it is to be hoped, less *Whigs* than their Ancestors, nor of the late Mr. *W——n's* Complexion, I shall appeal to the Conduct of the present Administration all the late Reign, and most of the present, and I assure myself that it will be admitted the Ministry all the while were of the true old *Whiggish* Standard. It is notorious, that an almost implicit Confidence was reposed by our Court in *France* ever since the Accession, till the Death of the Emperor *Charles VI.* a Period of near *thirty Years*. During all that long Period, this Doctrine now laid down as fundamental, was ridiculed and hooted at in our most August Assemblies, and a new *Credendum* substituted in its room, *viz.* Believe in *France*, and suspect the House of *Austria*; pull down the latter, and aggrandize the former. And, Sir, should you have forgot that the long Opposition of the few grumbling *Tories* in Parliament, was founded on the Administration's constant Adherence to this Doctrine, I beg you will, to justify me and satisfy yourself, consult
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Monf. *Rouffet's* Collections, fo revered, and often appealed to, by the Author of *Faction detefted*.

In order to juftify this new-fangled Doctrine, of hunting down *France* at all Hazard and Expence, it is laid down as a *postulatum*, that the *French* are our natural and implacable Enemies, tho' this be a Principle which that Nation constantly and absolutely difavow and deny. And, indeed, one need not wonder at this fo peremptory a Difavowal, if it be confidered how extravagant, feroce, unnatural, impious a Principle that of an unrelenting Hatred is; how repugnant to the Law of Nature and Nations, not to name that of the Gospel, which I am forry to fee fo little venerated of late.

Now whether the *French* do or do not merit the Character, I fhall not take upon me to determine at prefent; but this I am very clear in, that they are extremely prudent in difclaiming it, and that this wife Conduct of theirs has been, in feveral critical Conjunctures, of mighty Ufe to them. Why then, fince it is not unlawful to learn even from Enemies, do we not follow the wife Conduct of the *French* in this refpect, rather than juftify that implacable Hatred with which we charge them, by avowing it

it to be the ruling Principle of our own Conduct? May not Foreigners justly retort upon us, whenever we call upon them to assist towards reducing and humbling *France*,

‘ Whatever comes from you of this Kind
 ‘ deserves to be suspected; you avow your-
 ‘ selves to be the constant, unalterable Ene-
 ‘ mies of that Power, and therefore we
 ‘ may doubt, that you mean rather the
 ‘ Gratification of your *Prejudice*, than the
 ‘ Security of our Freedom and Interests.’

And I am not sure but the Weakness of the present Confederacy against *France*, is more owing to the Opinion which Foreigners entertain of our *false Prejudice* to that Crown, than to either the Gold, or superior Politicks of the *French* Cabinet. Behold how calmly all the Powers of *Germany*, the House of *Austria* excepted, the *Dane*, the *Swede*, in short all the Powers of *Europe*, except *Russia*, which may be lured by the Charms of our *Guineas*, to move, or seem to move, to our Aid; see, I say, how composed and serene all *Europe* look on, while this hated Power pushes her Conquests almost to the Heart of *Holland*.

There can possibly be but three Reasons assigned for the general Inattention of the Powers on the Continent to the late Rapidity of *French* Conquests, viz. That they
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conceive the *Ballance of Power* to be in no Danger, that Phantom which turned so many Heads in *England* since the Revolution; or that they suppose the Interest of *H——r* more consulted, and more nearly concerned, than that of *England*, in the Commencement and Consequences of the present War; or, lastly, that these Powers, conscious of our avowed *Prejudice to France*, seem not in an Humour to indulge to our national Weakness.

May it not be supposed that these neutral Powers had observed this *Prejudice*, or the Interest of *H——r* strongly operating, when we wantonly plunged ourselves into the War, and industriously brought it home to the *Dutch*? They might observe us transporting a large Body of Troops to the Continent, against the Opinion of those next exposed to the Power of *France*. They might likewise see us marching the same Troops beyond the *Main*, to draw the *French* out of *Austria, Bavaria, and Bohemia*, where they were *interring* the Flower of their Forces, and *sinking* their clearest and best Revenues. They might behold us, after the miraculous Escape at *Dettingen*, rejecting a Peace which would have restrained *France*, and prevented her ulterior Conquests, reconciled

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conciled the Empire, secured the *Dutch* Barrier, and produced general Safety and Tranquillity. Such must have been the necessary Consequences of the Peace we rejected at *Hanau* in 1743; and so obvious were they to all *Europe*, that 'tis no Wonder none of the neighbouring Powers have ever since interfered either to join us, or compose the Quarrel.

All these capital Errors, Errors that have run us already *thirty Millions* in Debt, that have lost all the *Austrian Netherlands*, and almost undone the *Dutch*, were owing either to a strong *Prejudice* to *France*, or in *favour* of *H——r*. Take it which way one will, it was unreasonable and unwarrantable; yet see how partially the masked *Scribe* I am considering, buries in Oblivion all the Errors of the *Minister* who presided in the Cabinet while those fatal Mistakes were committed, to traduce these Ministers who had no hand in those big Evils, and are supposed to be inclined to put the best and speediest End they can to an unsuccessful War.

* ' The Reader will readily perceive
' that I am here talking in Metaphor, and
' that I mean by the Nation, those who
' take upon themselves to govern, in Con-
' sequences of a Kind of *Self-Creation*, which

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' at once gave them being, and constituted
 ' them a M——y. These are the Men
 ' from whom I propose to sweat off all
 ' *Errors* and *Malignancy*, and by restoring
 ' them to a *right State of Judgment* give
 ' them *Honour*, and the Nation a well-
 ' considered Peace.'——Just before this
 sweating Paragraph, the Author plumes
 himself on having observed in his *State of*
the Nation for the preceding Year 1746,
 that the present Ministry found Affairs in
 a prosperous Condition.

* ' The Pretence of Ministers, who
 ' *force themselves into Power*, was next
 ' considered, who found *Affairs in a fine*
 ' *Train of Success*, but by their *ill Conduct*
 ' *threw them into Confusion*.'

But it seems this shrewd Censor, not
 content to tell us that he would sweat and
 purge the present Ministry, who, he says,
 ruined our flourishing Affairs by their ill
 Conduct, he charges them in direct Terms,
 in his *Almanack* of last Year, with being
Enemies to the Nation. † ' I conceive
 ' those to be *Enemies* to the State who un-
 ' dertake Posts they are *incapable* of exe-
 ' cuting, that squander away the *publick*
 ' *Money*, or employ People in the Service
 ' who

* Page 8, of the Introduction.

† Page 5, of *State of the Nation* for 1746.

‘ who are only fit for Places as being their
‘ Friends.’

I should quite tire you with Quotations from this *Granvillian* Champion, if I had inserted a Tythe of his abusive Investives against the present great Men in the Direction of our Affairs. With him, they are Fools, Madmen, and Enemies to their Country; and for what? for not reducing *France*, when they were forced to take up a losing Game, and for judging it more eligible to obtain the best Peace that can be had, than prosecute an unsuccessful War, against all the Lights of Reason and Experience, and the most stated Maxims of Prudence.

Yet, Sir, see what Sort of Peace this Monitor insists we shall obtain, against all those Lights of Reason and Prudence, which evidently point out to us a Discontinuance of the War when there are no Hopes of its becoming successful.

* ‘ A Peace as firm and lasting as glorious and beneficial; not productive of new War, nor making Peace and War equally expensive to us; not keeping us always in Terror, and upon our Guard; not fearing Invasions, nor dreading internal Enemies: But a Peace that must

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‘ make

‘ make the *French* perpetually dependent
 ‘ upon us, that will cure them for ever of
 ‘ setting the World in a Flame, and make
 ‘ them as much the Contempt, as they are
 ‘ now the Dread of their Neighbours.’—
 Again, ‘ The Nation expects it done, (such
 ‘ a Peace as he dictates above) they want
 ‘ not a Peace by Negotiation, but by
 ‘ Arms; a Peace that will execute itself
 ‘ and be perpetual.’

If you had not known the past ill Success of our Arms, and the present Imminency of the Danger of our best and powerfullest Allies, would you not conclude, on the viewing so imperious a Mandate to our Ministry as the above, that our national Troops had taken up their Winter Quarters in the *Isle of France*, that *Paris* was already in our Hands, and *Versailles* the Head Quarters of our Royal Leader?—
A Peace that must make France perpetually dependent upon us.——*Such a Peace the Nation expects.*——*But it must be obtained by the Sword, not by the Pen.*——

Pray, Sir, what do you think now of an Author that had so dreadfully alarmed your Fears? Can you reflect on the gloomy Prospect of our Affairs, and consider this dictating Politician as a true Friend to the Cause and Royal Family he pretends to
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serve? Is not the Mask lifted up high enough here to expose to your View the Incendiary and concealed J——e? Need you a more pregnant Proof that this *clubb'd* Performance, and such I have Reason for believing it to be, comes from a Partizan of *France* on one hand, and on the other, from a secret Friend to Mr. *W——n's old Constitution*?

You may possibly be able to guess, tho' I should be in an Error, who the *French* Partizan can be, by the pompous, but unmeaning Detail of the Election for the City of *L——n*, in which eight whole Pages (from Page 35 to 44) are employed to let the World know that a certain M——t was too hard for the *Aldermen*, whether by direct or *indirect* Means is another Question; and that * * The City of *London* has
 ' always been considered of distinguished
 ' Weight, and I hope will prove so in the
 ' House by the Value of her Representatives,
 ' which have never been equalled in my
 ' Time, as being all Men of Sense, unde-
 ' voted to any Faction.'

I hope, that not only the City of *London*, but all our Cities and Boroughs are represented by Men of *Sense* and Integrity, free from all Prejudices in favour of any
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foreign Country, from whence they might be originally derived; but let the Supposition be never so strong in favour of their Parts and Probity, I cannot see why either the Election of L——n, or the Merit of the present Representatives, are hawled into this Work, unless it was, that one of our Authors, perhaps not in such Opulence as the other, had made this Push for opening the Purse of his Chum, by offering him the fulsome Incense of a Pen, which diurnally plays the Fool for B——d.

And now, Sir, that I have laid my Thumb upon my *Men*, I hope you will be of Opinion, that you had unnecessarily admitted of an Embarrassment of Mind, which I am endeavouring to remove. You may perceive by the Work, which is obviously swelled out to an *Eighteen Pennyworth* for the main Purpose of *Gain*, that the Authors are in no Secrets of State, and are of no Weight or Consequence. You may observe that *one* pushes to be taken Notice of by those he *rails* at, and the other to be taken Notice of by his *Colleague*.

Such are the *Duumviri* that assume prescribing to the Court and Ministry, and that put you in a Panick, by insinuating, that our Governors were willing to make
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Peace without hazarding the Continuance of a successless War, in order to *beat France into an entire Dependance on this Nation*. The first in the high Commission draws his own Portrait tacitly in the flattering Encomiums bestowed on the *French* for the *uniform and judicious Conduct of their PRINCES AND MINISTERS*, which are enforced by the Translation of part of a pompous Declamation spoken by M. *Pavillon*, on his 'being admitted a Member of the Academy of Sciences at *Paris*, in the Reign of *Lewis XIV*. I wish we *English* were as national as the *French*; but we too early and easily forget the Source we are sprung from, whereas others retain the *patrial Leaven* for more Generations than one.

And could I suppose you, by this Time, at any Loss concerning the associate *Scribe*, I would direct you to the *Plain Reasoner* in 1745, the *State of the Nation* in 1746, and the *G—r*, six Days in the Week. But he shines so much *like himself* in this doughty Performance, that I should think it impossible for you to mistake him. In the first you may find him calling *the Nation Beetles for not seeing that the Revenues of France are less than ours; for not looking on France at best but as a Bugbear that frightens weak Spirits; and for not believ-*

ing, that to flounce deeper in the Mire is the Way to get out of it, or to increase one's Burden is the surest Way to get rid of it ; or, to use the *Reasoner's* own immediate and more pertinent Expression, *That the Increase of our publick Debts is the most probable, if not the only Means of lessening our Taxes.*

But I had unwarily like to have wronged our Author of the very Flower of all his wise Reflections, which is, * ' that it ' is better for us to be *One hundred Millions* ' in Debt than *Fifty.*' After this I hope you will harbour a better Opinion of your own Judgment, than to take this Writer's frothy Declamations and Reveries for Oration and Reasoning. You may perceive that the Conjuror is no better a Prophet than he is a Calculator, though he plumes himself, in the very first Page of his political Almanack of this Year, for the Rectitude of his Calculations, and having foretold the Year before, all that happened in the present.

' Before the State of the Nation is entered upon for the current Year, it may ' be extremely necessary to form a brief ' Recapitulation of what we remarked under the same Title the last Year, not only as it will have a natural Connection ' with

• *Plain Reasoner*, Pag. 23.

‘ with the ensuing, but will at the same
 ‘ time evince the *Impartiality of our Views,*
 ‘ the *Veracity of our Assertions,* and the *Es-*
 ‘ *fect of our Conjectures.*’

After so pompous a Portraiture of his own Sufficiency, one might expect he would have produced some Tests of the Superiority of his scientific Faculties; and to do the *modest Man* Justice, he attempts something like it; but unhappily he mistakes for Proofs in his Favour, such as most obviously make against him. On casting your Eye over his *State of the Nation* for last Year, you will find infinite Proof of the Truth of this Assertion, and particularly pag. 50, 51, 52, and 21, from whence I beg leave to borrow a few Extracts for your present Satisfaction.

‘ The Troops of our Allies are at least
 ‘ equal to those of *France*, and at present
 ‘ on the *gaining Side*. If any new Ally
 ‘ starts up for *France* against the Court of
 ‘ *Vienna*, the late Treaty with *Russia* will
 ‘ fully balance it; so that it does not any
 ‘ where appear by what Means the *French*
 ‘ Court can *extricate themselves out of their*
 ‘ *present Difficulties*, by bringing into the
 ‘ Field, in the *South of France*, an equal
 ‘ Number of disciplin’d Troops, as are
 ‘ already there of the Allies; nor find any
 ‘ Ally

' Ally capable of doing her any important
 ' Service. *The Event in the Eye of com-*
 ' *mon Sense is very clear, France must be*
 ' *soon ruined and exhausted, both by Sea and*
 ' *Land, except she can find Means to con-*
 ' *quer, which, at least, is not very pro-*
 ' *bable, either in the Low-Countries, or in*
 ' *South France.—Spain may be lost to her*
 ' *soon, and then the very Basis of her Sup-*
 ' *port falls of course.—As to the revolting*
 ' *State of Genoa, though it may require*
 ' *some Time to clear up, has no very fa-*
 ' *vourable Aspect towards the House of*
 ' *Bourbon, but rather seems on the Point of*
 ' *eminent Destruction.*—The Soldiers on
 ' our Part, and for ought I can see, *the Ge-*
 ' *nerals too, are full as good as the French ;*
 ' our Success on the Side of *Provence*, pro-
 ' bably a Balance for the Loss of the *Low-*
 ' *Countries.*—There is the best Appearance,
 ' that our Army in the *Low-Countries*, this
 ' Year, will be a *Match* for the *French.*—
 ' And as the Affairs of *Europe* in general
 ' are in a very *hopeful* Way, by the *happy*
 ' *Progress* of the Arms of the Allies on the
 ' Side of *South France*, I should not in
 ' the least doubt, that when his *Royal High-*
 ' *ness the Duke*, shall be appointed to com-
 ' mand again in *Flanders*, but that we shall
 ' have a *pleasant Prospect* on that Side.—
 Then

Then as for his Exactitude in Matter of Figures and national Expence, you shall find him mistaken in little more than a *single Million* in his Calculation of the Money granted for the Expence of the present Year.

You cannot hence, Sir, avoid perceiving the Unfitness of so loose a Calculator and Dabler in Politics, for the high Privilege he arrogates of alarming a Nation, dictating to a Court, and *sweating* a Ministry.—* ‘The Way to give Health, and Vigour to the State, is the same as to cure malignant Disorders in the human Body, that is to say, by *Sudorifics* and *Perspiration* : — In this Manner I propose to treat the Body Politic *annually*, until all its gross Humours evaporate.’ — You see you are to be plagued annually with the Empirick’s Prescriptions, unless he is taken down in Charity to the Public. For want of this Precaution the last Year, we are troubled with him at present. But as the late Sir *Richard Steele* had heretofore silenced *Partridge* by exposing his Impostor, so it is to be hoped his Brother Graduate may hereafter be struck dumb by being thus stript of those specious patriot Trappings with which he covered himself the better to impose on the Credulity

lity of the People for the Promotion of his Scheme, in Favour of Mr. W——n's cherished *old Constitution*. Even in regard to this Scribe, we know by Experience that he mends by Correction, or at least dares not offend, after Conviction, in *propria persona*. For being detected, about three Years ago, by an able Pen*, he never after pretended to appear a *Reasoner*, chusing to cover himself under another Appellation.

'Tis probable, though we should beat him out of his present *Title*, this Author will assume another the next Year; for the Man wants not for a modest Assurance, as you may judge by his exulting in his Lucubration of this Year, for the Exactitude of his Calculations, Observations, and Predictions in his last.

There is something very peculiar in the Construction of this Writer's Mind, which one shall not often meet with among *Englishmen*, and which would incline me to suspect that some *Foreigner*, or *Spawn* of a *Foreigner*, may be not only his *Instigator*, but *Coadjutor* likewise, in his reiterated Attempts to impose upon the Public. He has gone on from Winter to Winter for three Years past, promising Wonders, and securing no Success; and yet, though our

* Plain Answer to the Plain Reasoner. Affairs

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Affairs grow every Day more desperate, or at least, are in as unthriving a Way as ever, this intrepid Scribe goes on prescribing the same Dose to us, which we experimentally found to be noxious and unwholesome. *Faction detected*, from whence this Writer probably may have taken the Hint he annually pursues, assured us of beating *France* in a Campaign; next Year comes out the *Plain Reasoner*, who gives the like Assurances with as little Reality; then appears the *State of the Nation* of last Year, repeating the same Asseverations, and with as little Foundation; and yet in the present Year, we are still told we shall bang *France*, by a Continuance of the War, though full four Years Experience, one would think, ought to make us wiser than to take his Word, and him more modest than to offer it.

There is so great Petulancy, not to say Arrogancy, in thus persevering to impose upon the Publick, after being so often detected, and in the wrong, that one may very speciously be allowed to presume that some pert Foreigner or his *Offspring*, eggs on this Writer, and clubs with him in the Labour. The Politicks of *France* are known to be too refined for the gross Understandings of the Majority of *Englishmen*.

men. *Sempronius* is represented by Mr. *Addison* bellowing most in Favour of Liberty and the Commonwealth, when he was deepest in the Interest of *Cæsar*. And I don't find, if the late Mr. *W——n* may be credited, but part of our People may match even the *French* for Art and Diffimulation.

But to have Recourse only to the Work before us for the Proof of the Depth of *English* Policy, see how furiously this Author mouths at *France*, proclaims her Inability, and promises her Reduction, when she is on the Verge of subjecting *Holland*, of kindling a third successful Flame in *Italy*, and of rendering ineffectual all our Efforts to strengthen ourselves, by a Corps of *Russian* Auxiliaries, and by engaging the *Germanic* Body in our Cause. Must we not deem an Author uncommonly adroit, that can persuade us he is in Earnest all the while that he is spiriting up the Nation to pursue an unequal, unsuccessful Conflict? If, before *France* had won an Inch of the *Austrian Netherlands*, she was able to baffle and beat us, what View can we have of Success against her in the present flourishing Situation of her Affairs on the Continent?

But we are told by this adventurous Monitor, that her Successes in the *Netherlands*

go

go for nothing, inasmuch as we shall be able to ruin her in one Summer by Sea, then get all her Trade, which he admits to be more lucrative than ours, and so make ourselves whole at once for all our Expences since the Revolution by adding the profitable Trade of *France* to our own.

As extraordinary as this Scheme for reducing *France* may appear to you, there is nothing plainer under the Sun than that such is the Purport of all this Writer's present incoherent Lucubration, if a Work, which has neither Order, Connexion, nor Reasoning, may be said to have any Meaning at all. You will find the Work a Whole, composed of Parts as little relative to each other, as they are altogether to the Design of the Performance, which may be supposed to have been the giving a general Idea of the State of our Affairs. But how is this attempted to be performed by the Author, by jumbling together several detached Subjects, most of them quite foreign to the main Design, in so disjointed a Manner, that the first Part of the Work may as well be the latter; and either, or both, the Middle.

The Writer had caught the Itch of dabling in Politicks, would write to get a Penny

Penny, to alarm the People, to answer the secret Purposes of his masked *Party*, to blacken and distress the present Ministry, and to restore a late fallen Minister. In such a Flow of different Ideas, what could a weak Brain do else but stuff into his Work all the good Things he had heard or read of, whether pertinent or otherwise ?

Thus may we account for the Detail (pag. 24.) of the Chancellor of the *Ex—r*'s Method of ascertaining the *Quantum* of the current Supplies, and the manner of raising them. So likewise may be accounted for the whole tedious Progress of the late Election for *L—n*, and particularly his outdoing, pag. 30, where he presents his Reader with the choice Nofegay of a Simile, which, for its Beauty and Pertinence, may be as well the Offspring of the Laureat as the F — 1. ‘ If any one has seen
 ‘ a young Girl disappointed of her Husband the Moment the Priest was going to
 ‘ join their Hands, so now looked Courtier at Courtier, Corporation-Man at Corporation-Man.’ — And what was it that had wrought this wonderful Surprise in Corporation-Men and Courtiers ? *The sudden Appearance of two potent Adversaries that had been hid behind the Curtain*, as he tells in the same Page, which were
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Sl—y B—ll and *St—n Tb—*: *J—n*,
Esqrs.— 'Tis possible, that the Sight of
two Gentlemen of so very great Importance
may have scared timid Courtiers and Cor-
poration-Men out of their Senses; but
how a longing poor young Girl could be
disappointed of *HER Husband before she had*
one, is what some future *G—z—r* may
clear up, if the learned Author be in an
Humour to vindicate an *intimate Acquaint-*
ance.

The Author himself best knows with
what View he has spent so much of his
Ink, and filled so many Pages of his Work,
to shew us, that he had read the Treaty
of *Munster* had been concluded in 1648,
that of the *Pyrenees* in 1659, that of *Ni-*
meguen in 1679, and the Peace of *Ryswick*
in 1697, and to give us a just Idea of his
Accuracy, he descends to be so minute as
to inform his illiterate Readers, that this
last Treaty was concluded in the Month
of *September*. He had finished the Por-
traiture of his *Exactitude*, if he had inserted
the Day of the Month and *Hour* of the
Day; but *Homer* himself nodded some-
times.

Nor are we to wonder if one so much
more intent to frighten and deceive, than
to set right and inform, should interlard

his Work with such Scraps of History and Hearsay, as might set his Readers a staring, and in their Surprise, forget or overlook the main Drift of his Undertaking, which was to over-load and perplex the Nation by the Continuance of an unsuccessful War, the better to restore the late Mr. *W——n's Old Constitution*.

Behold how judiciously, pag. 34, he blends the *Dutch* with the *Ministry* in a strong Opposition to the H——r A——t, or, as he more elegantly phrases it, *that rising Genius of the Nation*. But being one of those accurate Scribes that never dishes up a *What* to their Readers without a *Wherefore*, he presently acquaints us what had principally occasioned this *Coalition*. 'It was,' says he, pag. 35, the *starting up an antiquated Right in the Duchy of Cornwall*.—But behold the Author's edifying Perspicuity in developing his Subject, and clearing it up gradually to the Understanding of the meanest Capacity. First, he *starts up a Right* which puzzles the Reader to find out; and then presently sets his Mind at Quiet, by informing him that 'There was at this Time produced to 'Light some *Old Records* of the Duchy, 'which seemed to give a Right to the 'Prince of *Wales*, as Duke of *Cornwall*,
 ' of

‘ of convening any where, within the Limits of the Duchy, a Parliament of Tinners, to be continued together as long as their Principal, or his Deputy, by his Directions, should think convenient.’

Here was Matter enough to alarm the Ministry and the *Dutch*, who might be overthrown, the latter by *Lewis XV.* and the former by the late Minister, should the lack-learning *Cornwall* Parliament be permitted to sit. ‘ This, to be sure, at so delicate a Crisis, alarmed the Ministry, and put them on using their best Endeavours to obviate so important an Opposition as such a Balance against them must have created.’

But this *Balance* so exceedingly dreaded, as you shall see by and by, was, however, in such impartial Hands, as that it was not likely to prove any *Balance* at all. ‘ It happened very luckily for them, that these *Records* were not in the Hands or Power of any of the Duchy Officers ; they were in the Hands of an eminent Lawyer, unbyassed to either Party, and to whom both made a very arduous Application.’ — It concerns not the Public, we will suppose, who the *unbyassed* Lawyer was, or how aptly the Epithet may be annexed to the Profession of the Law, how he came by the Cu-

study of those important *Records*, what Right he had to detain them from him who could alone be intitled to the Possession of them ; nothing of all this, without doubt, was thought necessary by the Author, or so accurate a Pen would have obliged the Reader, who must presently after wonder exceedingly, why the *Dutch* and our Court were convulsed, since an *unbyassed* Gentleman had the Custody of the *Records*, which, by being in the *proper Hands*, could alone contribute to produce the Convulsion.

Yet, tho' these tremendous *Parchments* were in Hands not to be *corrupted* by Promises from L——r H——e, or *Gold* and Promises from A——n S——t, we shall find the *Dutch* and our Ministry driven to the very Verge of Despair, for Fear the Lawyer should not love *Gold*, or should drop the *Substance* to catch at the *Shadow*.—How little and weak do Men in the highest Stations appear, sometimes, when produced in their native Colours ! behold how the *High and Mighty*, both at Home and Abroad, tremble at a Phantom.

' While this was in Agitation, and both
' Sides in doubt which should succeed, both
' the *Dutch* and *British* M——y, were
' at their *Wits Ends* for fear of the Event.
' They weighed every Circumstance, can-
' vassed

' vassed every Measure, and puzzled and
 ' perplexed themselves to no Purpose, *Re-*
 ' *flexion* * *worked on Reflexion, Thought on*
 ' *Thought*; they looked on one another
 ' like Men bewildered in a Storm (an Im-
 ' provement of the late poignant *Simile* of
 ' the young Woman that had lost a *Huf-*
 ' *band* before she had one) expecting every
 ' Moment the finishing Gust, that must
 ' give them their *Quietus*.'—Nay, Sir; do
 not despair for all this melancholy Painting,
 You shall find our Author can as readily
 extricate his *Actors*, as confound and per-
 plex them; and he shall do this in a man-
 ner, which no other Writer in the World
 but himself would have undertaken or
 thought of. While the despairing *Hol-*
landers and our Ministry were in this di-
 stracted Condition, not knowing whether to
 hang or drown, behold how a Dawn of
 Day broke in upon them to direct their
 Steps to Safety of Body and Mind.

— ' When suddenly a Glare of Light
 ' appeared from a Quarter they least ex-
 ' pected, the Halcyon Day returned, and
 ' brightened all their Cares into Joy and
 ' Transport.'—— How poetically expres-
 sed! *Brightened all their Cares!*—— It
 would be a Pleasure to the Curious, cer-
 tainly,

tainly, if the learned Author had here condescended to explain himself a little more amply. He might have told us whether these *Cares so brightened*, were filed bright, varnished with shining Paint, or studded with small Brilliant Diamonds. But such small Slips being pardonable in great Wits, let us return to our Author, who himself *brightens*, as he proceeds in his Narrative, in Proportion to the Rust he files off the *Cares* of his Agents.

He not only told us the *Halcyon Day* was returned, but obligingly tells that it was brought on by the *only Man in the Nation the least likely to contribute to the Quiet of the Ministry, or to set them right*. Let the World judge if I exaggerate in the Portraiture. ‘ They had luckily intimidated to the K——g the Necessity of
 ‘ learning the Sentiments of *the only Man*
 ‘ they feared would necessarily succeed on
 ‘ a Change, now seemingly approaching ;
 ‘ they waited for some Time with *Terrors*
 ‘ enough, when at length they were told
 ‘ with a gracious Smile, that their Safety
 ‘ purely depended on the *Dissolution* of
 ‘ the Parliament.’

Some

Some have supposed, I hope invidiously, that all this was of the Author's own pure Invention; because, say they, 'tis unlikely the late *Minister*, who always was, and is still, cherished by the P—e, would give *Advice* that should put not only his royal Patron, but himself too, more in the Power of the Ministry than ever. He must be weaker and more self-denying than he is deemed to be, to act thus a Part, which *Machiavel* would decry, and his very Enemies laugh at him for. But what of that and much more, which might be urged against, not only the Infallibility, but Impropriety of this long-winded Digression. 'Tis enough that the learned Author had a Mind to put the *Dutch* and Ministry in a Fright, and to emblazon the Character of his Hero, the late Minister; and whose Business is it to find Fault with Men of Wit and Genius?

Therefore as he may think it to be none of mine, I shall take leave of him here, as to his *Pieces detachées, pour embellir & remplir*, to pursue him to the Main of his Subject, which appears to have been to frighten the Ministry from all Thoughts of Peace for a Summer or two, that in the Interim, we

may take the Chance of totally undoing the Dutch and ourselves, or ruining France. Such is the sage Advice of this public Censor, such undoubtedly is the Scope and Purport of his Pamphlet, if it may be said to have any, except celebrating the very shining Merit of a certain young *Representative* of a very great City, and the late *Minister*, from both whom may be *Expectations* of different Complexions. But lest he should hold me inexcusably stupid for not perceiving the Profundity of his Conception, as to the Nature and Extent of Government, I beg leave to trouble you with a few of his *self-evident* Principles on the Subject. * ‘ Every Minister in a
‘ free State either proceeds on a *new Plan*,
‘ or moves by *none at all*. If on a new
‘ one, *the Chain is broke that should hold*
‘ *the State together*, and if on *none at all*,
‘ then the *Spirit of the People governs*.’—
For my part, though I persuade myself there is something very new and shining in all this, I readily own it beyond the scanty Measure of my poor Comprehension; therefore humbly leave the Discussion of its Sublimity to the *Literati* at *Tom’s* or *Child’s*, as well as of the Super-
Elegancy

Elegancy of the harmonious Author *on*,
 the Stupidity of Ministerial Men. * ‘ It’s
 ‘ a Pity that even the most desperate Ne-
 ‘ cessities of the State won’t turn the Minds
 ‘ of *Ministerial Men* to the reflecting on
 ‘ the impending Danger, nor seek to shel-
 ‘ ter themselves under the *hospitable Cover*
 ‘ of *evident Reſtitute*,’ &c.——But to
 the Author’s principal Design.

To shew then his Drift at once in its
 strongest Light, I shall quote his own
 Words, as being undoubtedly more apt
 than any I could substitute in their Place.
 † ‘ I doubt not to see this War happily
 ‘ ended, with the entire Destruction of
 ‘ the *French Commerce*; which must be
 ‘ done, or as I have shewn before, all our
 ‘ Labour is in vain, our Debts are much
 ‘ too high to be paid by any other Means
 ‘ in Nature; and as they must be higher,
 ‘ there is no alternative left us, but *to*
 ‘ *have Peace on our own Terms*, or become
 ‘ the Slaves of *France*.——In a Word,
 ‘ *one of us must now fall*, which, next un-
 ‘ der Heaven, is in our own Power to de-
 ‘ termine,’ &c.

You may observe here, Sir, that old
Roman Spirit, which glowed in the Breast
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of those renowned Republicans during the *Punic Wars*. *Delenda est Gallia*.——Britain or France *now must fall*; and we are here advised to run the Risk of that tremendous *Fall*, to obtain a Peace *on our own Terms*.

But you are not to suppose our Author so much a Visionary as to build upon Miracles only. I assure you he has his Pouch well stored with *Hopes*, which you will find to be solidly grounded. * ‘ Our *Hopes*,
 ‘ in the mean time, are centered in the
 ‘ Prince of *Orange*’s getting the better of
 ‘ the *French* Party, and effectually rooting
 ‘ them out of the Army and Government;
 ‘ on the *Russian* Forces coming timely in
 ‘ to our Aid; on our Naval Affairs being
 ‘ pursued with Spirit; and of our bringing
 ‘ such an Army into the Field, as may
 ‘ be able to face the *French*.’

Here is the whole Chain of his political Strength for giving *France* the *Fall* he would persuade us to attempt; but should any of its Links give way, I apprehend it too obvious that we may receive the *Fall* instead of giving it.

It may be impracticable for the Prince of *Orange*, and perhaps not safe for him, to attempt

attempt so thorough and sudden a Change in the Army and Government, as the Author contends for, while a powerful, successful *French* Army is within the Territories, if not the Bowels, of the Republick. Here then may we be allowed to suppose that this first Link of his Chain may fail.

———Let us essay the next.

The *Russians* may be prevented by domestic or neighbouring Distractions, either real or *pretended*; may be impeded in their March, *should they march in earnest*, either by *Prussia* or *France*; may come too late to obstruct such Conquests of the Enemy, as may reach even the Vitals of the Republick; or, should none of those Impediments intervene, *France* may still be an over-match for the Confederates in the Field, by means of *Swedish*, *Prussian*, and other *German* Auxiliaries, or by a forced Augmentation of her native Troops, to make a dernier Effort. In either Case, what would become of *Holland*, should this Link likewise fail? and, to our very great Sorrow, the Appearance is but too strong, that it may.

The fourth Link of his Chain, I chuse to consider before the *third*, being naturally and more immediately connected with
the

the second, which related to the *Russians*.— If the *Russians* should not join us, there is no Appearance that *we can bring such an Army into the Field, as may be able to face the Enemy*; and even if they should, 'tis a Doubt, a very great one, whether *France* might not out-number, and over-match us after the Junction : Therefore at best, this *third Link* of the sanguine Author's Chain of *Hopes*, is but conjectural. Would then a wise Man or a Friend to our present Establishment, risque the Fate of the Nation on a simple, I fear an untenable Conjecture? I appeal to your, and every Reader's Understanding, if the Author has not here evidently display'd the *Hoof*, and confirmed himself to be of the *Winning-tonian* Sect.

But as greatest Stress is laid throughout the whole Work, on the *third Link* of this imaginary Chain, that is, on our conquering and retaining all the *French Colonies*, before *France* overcame the *Dutch*, we will examine this Point separately and more minutely. This is the more necessary, that the Author himself tells us that both we and the *Dutch* are inevitably undone, unless we succeed in the Attempt. But is it not probable that we are declaim'd into a
Desire

Desire of making an Attempt of so sickly a Contexture, in order to a Recovery of the *old Constitution*.

This important Conquest, according to this dispatching Scribe, is to be made in one Summer, or our Ministry deserve to be hanged. * ‘ Our naval Power, while ‘ the *Dutch* cover the Seas with Privateers, ‘ may finish the Destruction of the *French* ‘ Trade, with great Facility; and this, ‘ with due Attention, may be effected in ‘ *one Summer*.——Again, if our Fleet ‘ cannot make such a Peace as we want in ‘ *one Summer*, I know what some *People* ‘ *deserve*.’

It were to be wished the Author had told us in what particular manner he would advise the attacking the *French* Settlements, that we may be the better able to judge of his military Skill. But since he has not thought proper to let his Readers be as wise as himself, for I will suppose he had formed a Scheme of the Conquest he intended; since, I say, he has not informed the Public, how the Conquest may be made, I shall endeavour to point out the Probability of our making none that can balance the *Risque*, should

we

we make the Experiment, by continuing the War.

All Queen *Anne's* War, we were as much Masters at Sea as now, and we were Conquerors wherever the War was kindled on the Continent; yet we never attempted a Conquest of the *French* Colonies, but once of *Canada*, in which we failed, and not for Want of either Skill or Resolution, so much as through a natural Impracticability that attends the Attempt of such distant Conquests from a brave and the most experienced Nation in the World in the Art military. We took *Cape Breton*; but had the *French* Ministry done their Duty, as they easily might, in sending early and necessary Supplies to *Louisbourg*, we might have had sufficient Reason to repent us of the Attempt. But are we presumptuously to expect that the Court of *France* will be always as remiss, and that we shall always have the like Success?

I don't know what might have been the happy Consequence, if the Blow had been immediately followed after the taking *Cape Breton*; but if the most intelligent, in the Strength of both Nations, in that Northern Part of *America*, may be credited,

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ditioned, we have no Chance of conquering *Quebeck*, without which all other Acquisitions there would turn to little Account. So that in North *America*, the Chance of our not succeeding to root out the *French* there, is at best precarious, perhaps impracticable. And were it otherwise, I fear the Conquests of *France* in the *Netherlands* would render us very tractable on a Peace, on which Occasion, I apprehend we shall be obliged to restore *Cape Breton*, the only Conquest we have been able to make, since the War, with all our vast Superiority by Sea.—We are next to examine the Feasibility of subduing the *French* Sugar Colonies, the only they have in *America*, except their Settlement on the River *Mississipi*, which I suppose the Author himself would not advise attempting.

The principal of the *French* Sugar Settlements, are *Martinico* and *St. Domingo*, or *Hispaniola* divided between them and the *Spaniards*. To begin with the latter, I will take upon me to assert that the *French* alone on that Island, are able to raise 20000 effective Men, willing and able to defend their Properties against a foreign Invader. And we may naturally suppose, that the *Spaniards* on the Island, would

would rather aid their *Catholic* Neighbours, than us Protestants. Besides, it is no Secret, that the principal Harbours of that fine Island, particularly those in the *French* Possession, are regularly and strongly fortified.

In such a Situation then, can we suppose the Conquest of this *French* Sugar Colony to be so practicable and easy, as this adventurous Writer would persuade us it is? Is there not greater likelihood, that the *French*, from so populous a Colony, contiguous to *Jamaica*, may invade that Island of ours, than that we should be able to subdue them?

The Probability of our succeeding against *Martinico* is still stronger against us, if it be true, as I take upon me to say it is, that the *French* are able to arm 40000 good Men, in Defence of that valuable Island. There is not one acquainted with the vast Superiority of the *French* in those Parts, that wonders not they had not invaded our *Leeward* Islands, since this War, and that scruples to own, they might, the two first Years of it, have ruin'd all those Islands in a Fortnight. There is no disputing that they had Force enough at *Martinico* only, to do the Work; nor can they
ever

ever want it when inclined; or fear succeeding, if the Superiority of our naval Force don't prove the Safety of our Fellow-Subjects in those Parts.

The *French*, 'tis true, have a few more small Sugar Islands, such as *Guardeloupe* and *Mariegalante*; but they, if conquered, would be but a poor Equivalent for the Continuance of an expensive and unsuccessful War. And I am not clear, that we could subdue even these small Colonies with all our maritime Force, considering how populous and well fortified they are, the Weakness of our contiguous Colonies in Men capable of bearing Arms, and their Distance from this Center of our Force and Power.

Hence, Sir, you may perceive how very wide our Author shoots off the Mark, in supposing we shall be able in *one Summer*, to ruin the *French* Trade, by the Conquest of their Colonies. We might indeed in a Course of many Years, if the *French* should sleep as they have of late Years, in regard to their Marine, reduce their Sugar Islands to great Distress, by obstructing the Intercourse between them and their Mother Country. But would such a slow Reduction, or rather

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the *Hopes* of a Reduction, compensate for our ill Success on the Continent in the mean time? And are we sure that the *French* will always stand in their own Light and neglect their Marine, as they have done of late, to extend their Trade? Besides, were we able to beat them out of their whole Trade during the War, we should but raise so many more Enemies, so much more powerful Rivals, who might, by applying all their Attention to their Marine, and employing all their Seamen to annoy us, become an Over-Match for a Nation that must necessarily employ the greater Number of our Seafaring Men in the carrying on an extensive Commerce.

Our thoughtless *Monitor* insists that we beat the *French* out of all their Trade, or we are undone. I have endeavoured to shew above, that the Odds are many against us, that we could not if we would, conquer the *French American* Colonies, and that if we did, we should be obliged on a Peace to restore them all. How do you think the *Dutch* would relish the Detention of their Barrier, and even of their conquer'd Territories, by *France*, because we should refuse restoring our Conquests upon

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upon her in *America*? Nor should we have the popular Cry less against us in behalf of the Courts of *Vienna* and *Turin*, should we pretend to retain such Conquests, which must necessarily be at the Expence of our Allies.

The only Trade we could have any Chance of getting out of the Hands of the *French* intirely, is that to the *East-Indies*; but even this fair Prospect may vanish, should our late great Armament to those Seas meet with bad Weather, Sicknes, Shipwreck, or many other cross Accidents and Casualties, to which naval Expeditions are liable, particularly those at so vast a Distance.

You see, Sir, that even this Conquest, the likeliest of all we can make on the *French*, is far from being so real as may be imagined by those who view only the fairer Side of the Picture. And it has this also in common with Conquests in *America*, could we make any, that we should be obliged to part from them, unless we could beat Count *Saxe* beyond the *Loire* and *Garrone*.

As for the general *European* Trade of *France*, which is the necessary Consequence of her Climate, Situation, Products, Oeconomy,

mony, Skill, and Industry of her Inhabitants, the Author has not thought fit to explain himself, whether we shall continue the War till we beat her out of it, or indulge her with it, because it would be impossible to wrest it from her, unless we should be adroit enough to persuade the *Turks, Spaniards, Italians, Danes, Swedes, Germans, Poles, Russians, &c.* neither to eat, drink, or wear any of the Products or Manufactures of that Country; or if these several Nations were not to be persuaded, that we should sag them into a Compliance.

To be serious, my dear Friend, how thoughtless must this sanguine Writer and his mercantile *Chum* be, if they were in earnest in their vehement Exhortations to continue the War, till we could beat *France* out of all her Commerce? How thoughtless should we be if we had swallowed the Bait on the Credit of Scribes that seek our Ruin to promote their secret Schemes? And how heedless and unjust would our Ministry be to continue the War, if any tolerable Peace can be obtained, in order to hunt after chimerical Conquests and Trades, which if possessed, we should most certainly be obliged to part from?

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But 'tis to be hoped the Nation are wiser than to be thus lured to their Undoing by Declaimers, that are no less Strangers to the Subject they pretend to treat of, than to that Truth and Candor which warm the Patriot's Breast.

It is obvious to a Demonstration, that the Performance under my present Consideration, was calculated for depreciating and perplexing the present Ministry, to make way for a new, at the Head of which, the Author would wish to see the *late Minister* placed. This being the evident Purport of the Piece, it will be proper to consider it with some Attention. As for the *secret Views* of the Author or Authors, in favour of *W——n's old Constitution*, though they appear to me almost equally evident, from the Consequence of replacing the late adventurous *M——r* at the Head of Affairs, I will however chuse to leave you yourself to draw what Conclusion you think may be truly founded on the whole Performance taken collectively.

You must necessarily perceive the Scope and Tendency of the Author to be the plunging your Country into inextricable Difficulties, by the Continuance of a suc-

cessless War, grown already much too burthenfome for us: Nor is it less obvious that he would thrust out those whom he suspects to be pacificly inclined, as foreseeing the impendent Ruin, in order to make way for *Him* that had brought all our present Calamities upon us, and who is the most likely Man in the Nation to compleat our Destruction, by precipitating us from one ruinous Measure to another, till, on Mr. *W*———*n*'s Plan, we shall be glad to do our *best Work*, as he calls treading back and ripping up the boasted glorious Work of our Fathers in 1688.

The Author himself scruples not to own that the *Dutch* are on the Verge of Destruction, and tacitly confesses, as he necessarily must, that our Ruin is blended with their Fall.— * ‘ On their
 ‘ (*French*) being possessed of *Holland*, the
 ‘ whole System of Affairs will take quite
 ‘ a new Turn; either the Lovers of Liberty will drown their Country, and
 ‘ retire hither; or, if the *French* Party
 ‘ be more prevalent, the *French* will come
 ‘ into Possession of that rich Maritime
 ‘ Country, and therewith acquire an Addition to their Sugar Trade by having
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‘ *Surinam*, and it’s highly probable the whole *East-Indies*.’—Again, ‘ I am verily persuaded, that something of this Nature is nearly approaching, whether we *continue the War*, or agree to a *shameful Peace*, &c.’

You see here, Sir, a tacit Avowal that the Continuance of the War may be attended with infinite Danger to our present Constitution, yet the Drift of the Author’s whole Book is to lure the Nation into a Relish for the successful Pursuit. Every Peace, with this Scribe, must be *shameful*, that does not render *France* dependant on *England*; therefore, as such a *Dependance* is morally impracticable, as Matters are now situated, ’tis manifest the Author must have some secret View in urging so unseasonably and ardently the Continuance of the War; and what other can that deep-laid Design be, but the throwing the Nation into so great Confusion and Despair, as that, to get rid of our Miseries, we shall be ripe for any Change that might give us a Chance for Relief.

Whom then, my dear Friend, would you chuse to trust with the Direction of public Affairs, the *Man* that had wantonly

plunged the Nation into all our present Difficulties, that had brought all their present Distresses on the *Dutch*, and who, if he had Influence, would perpetuate their and our Perplexities ; or those, who would put the speediest and safest End possible to a War, which, if as successful as for the Time past, must, by its Continuance, inevitably ruin the *Dutch*, and probably bring on the Dissolution of our present cherished Constitution ?

That the late M——r brought the present *French* War upon us, is beyond all Controversy ; or, at least, that our Conduct during his Ministry had provoked *France* to declare against us. It will be as little controverted, that the same Conduct had brought the War into the *Netherlands* against the Opinion and Consent of the *Dutch*, who are now reduced to Despair by that precipitate Measure.

Again, 'tis notorious that the same *Man* presided over our Councils, when the Mediation of the King of *Prussia* was rejected at *Hanau* in 1743, by which Means that Prince was cooled and weaned from any Attachment he might have had before that for our Court, and an honour-
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able and permanent Tranquillity was prevented.

The same Minister likewise concluded the Treaty of *Worms* the same Year, the flagrant Injustice of which, forced the *Genoese* into the Alliance of *France* and *Spain*, than which Junction with our Enemies, nothing could have contributed more to strengthen the *Bourbon*, and weaken the *Austrian* Interest in *Italy*. The fatal Consequences of that mistaken Treaty was nervously and prophetically pointed out by an accurate Pen *, soon after its Conclusion; and Time has since abundantly evinced the Rectitude of the judicious Author's Conjectures. Yet this is the very Measure, for which we see that *Minister* incensed by this partial Scribe, and, by a daily Writer, no more the *Fool* than him.

Let the Scene now be changed to those at present in the Direction of our Affairs. There was no recalling immediately what had been done by the late M ———r. He had shuffled and cut, and dealt out the Cards so, that his Successors had no Option left but that of playing the Game
the

* Free Thoughts on the Treaty of *Worms*, &c.

the best they could, in Hopes some Change, Death, or other lucky Accident abroad, might intervene to accelerate the putting a safe and honourable End to the Contest. They have tried the Fortune of War with Courage; they have waited for fortunate Events with Steadiness; but neither having answered their Hopes, what ought they to do? How are they to act when involved in a burthensome unpropitious War? Ought they to continue it at the Hazard of ruining their Allies and their own Country, or put a Period to it on the best Terms that can be obtained before the Enemy's Conquests reach the Vitals of the *Dutch*?

Surely, my Friend, the Eligibility of the alternative is too obvious to need Argument. If we continue the War, and it prove unsuccessful, the *Dutch* will be undone, and we must be buried in their Ruin. The Conquest of the *French* Colonies, and the Destruction of their whole Commerce, is a mere Chimera, as I have shewn before. Could the Conquest be made, our Allies would, and must be obliged to join so far with the Enemy, as to exact a Restitution of whatever might be wrested from the *French* in the new World.

It

It would be impossible to make Peace without such Restitution, unless *France* be driven out of all her Conquests in the *Netherlands*, which may be rather wished for, than relied on. Yet see how differently this Writer pretends to judge of the Matter.

* ‘ In this I see not any rational Alternative, nor can conceive on what Terms it is possible to make Peace, but such as must be attended with inevitable Ruin.’

— This inconsistent Author argued to the same Purport in his *State of the Nation* for last Year; and yet since his writing that Incendiary Piece, we have had such Overtures of Peace made to us by *France*, as might be embraced even in a successful War. What could be wished for more, in the then State of the War, than for *France* to offer restoring all her Conquests, in case a moderate Settlement should be agreed to for *Don Philip* in Italy, and that a small District in the Duchy of *Luxemburg*, contiguous to the Territories of *France* on that Side, should be yielded to that Crown?

These

These are such Preliminaries as I presume to assert were offered by *France*, and repeated. And pray, why may not a Peace founded on such Preliminaries be made without being attended with *inevitable* Ruin, the Consequence, according to this Author, of making any Peace, till we shall have conquered the *French* Colonies, and possessed ourselves of all their Trade? But herein especially appears the Author's *secret Views*. With him, our *Ruin is inevitable* if Peace be made; and why? but that he supposes, and very justly, that the Continuance of the War must so perplex us, that we shall plunge into any Measure that promises any Relief, or even a Change of Misery, which is some Alleviation in Pain.

But our Ministry, who have no View but to the Honour and Happiness of their Country and Prince, will, 'tis to be hoped, entertain other Notions concerning Peace and War, in a Conjunction the most critical and perilous that has ever been known. And if they are to blame for any Part of their past Conduct, 'tis, that they did not close with the Proposals of *France*, before she invaded the Territories of *Holland*; and that they abetted an Attack on the

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Genoese, a neutral Nation, which brought on the Invasion of *France*. For though she may have made, or listened, to Overtures since ; nay, though she and *Spain* may have complimented us with the sending Emissaries Home to us to treat of Peace, yet I cannot persuade myself that the *French* are as tractable now, as before the Conquest of *Bergen-op-zoom*. And still, I am of Opinion, 'tis our Interest to listen to an Accommodation on the best Terms that can be obtained.

If I could suppose that the slipping so favourable, I may say, happy an Occasion of putting an End to the War, was owing to the *Tenaciousness* or Corruption of any Men in Power, I should as readily give them up, as I do the late M——r for rejecting the Offers of the last Emperor at *Hanau*. But I will hope the Error lies *elsewhere*, for the sake of *Englishmen* ; and that, for the sake of *England*, no *Interest* will be more regarded or cherished than hers, in any Negotiation that may be now on the Anvil, or may hereafter be set on foot.

Before I take Leave of you, or quit this Writer, so extolled and supported by the *Servants* and *Dependents* of a *Personage*, as
beloved

beloved as he is wise, good and eminent, I cannot, in Gratitude to the Royal *Youth* who commanded for us and our Allies Abroad, but animadvert on the Indecency of this Scribe in regard to that illustrious Hero, no less conspicuous for military Skill than personal Bravery. * ' When ' the Duke of *Marlborough* commanded, ' the common Soldiers signalized themselves in a distinguished Manner, not ' only as they depended on the *Judgment* ' of their General, but as they knew he ' was always provided to carry any Point ' he determined on.'

This needless Panegyric on the *Skill* and *Judgment* of the Duke of *Marlborough* needs no Comment. The scandalous Use designed to be made of it, and the Reflection intended to be fix'd by it, are too obvious to escape your Penetration. I shall therefore leave the Chastisement of a Writer, that thus dares tacitly reflect on the *Judgment* of the most promising military Genius of the Age, to your, and the Reader's Discretion, assuring myself you will still have a View to his *secret Byass* to *W——n's old Constitution*, in passing Sentence upon him.

If

If you should still doubt that he is not the Incendiary I would represent him, and for the dark Purpose I have hinted, I hope you will be convinced by reflecting on the following Portraiture of *England*, lately drawn by the same *Pen*, wherein you will find us satyriized for a Conduct, which in his *State of the Nation*, he recommends with the utmost Ardour and Vehemence.

* ‘ *Great Britain*, I conceive, is in a
 ‘ Situation very particular and distinct,
 ‘ from what either the Ancients knew, or
 ‘ the Moderns are well acquainted with.
 ‘ We are in the Character of Balance-
 ‘ Masters-General, to fight every Body’s
 ‘ Battles, and arbitrate every Nation’s
 ‘ Difference ; no War ever lasts long but
 ‘ what we have a Hand in ; not any
 ‘ Peace made where we are not the prin-
 ‘ cipal contracting Parties ; so that, like
 ‘ *Augustus Cæsar*, we either give the World
 ‘ Rest ; or, like the *Roman Senate*, let
 ‘ all the Nations know what a happy
 ‘ Talent we have at Fighting. The House
 ‘ of *Austria* and *Sardinia*, the *Seven United*
 ‘ *Provinces*, and the *Empire*, (and more
 ‘ especially *H——r*, he might have said)
 ‘ are all under our express Care and Guar-
 dianship ;

• *Fool*, No. 239.

‘dianship; and when we cannot defend
 ‘them by our own natural Power, we
 ‘fetch Succours from the remotest Re-
 ‘gions; happy in that, we always carry
 ‘our Point at last; but much happier in
 ‘always having a Point to carry.’

Could you imagine the same Pen draw-
 ing this Picture of his Country, and at the
 same time declaiming her into a Continu-
 ance of an inauspicious, successless War?
 By this little Finger you may judge of the
Hercules, who has brought this Address
 upon you, *From Yours, &c.*

F I N I S.